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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
good faith and there was an immediate and compelling necessity.24 Landlords
applied for a certificate of eviction on grounds that the apartment was needed
for a resident superintendent. The State Rent Administrator ruled that the land-
lords had failed to fulfill the requirements of good faith and necessity, because a
resident superintendent was not required by any law, the action was brought only
after tenant complained about the apartment service, and the landlords did not
place such needed superintendent in other vacant apartments.
A Court may not overrule the judgment of an administrator when there was
a reasonable basis for such judgment.25 From the facts it is evident that a reason-
able basis for such judgment did exist. The Court was justified, therefore, in
overruling the lower court and upholding the finding of the State Rent
Administrator.
Timely Proceedings Under Article 78
A recurring problem in proceedings under Article 78 of the Civil Practice
* Act to review action by administrative or corporate bodies is the question of the
timeliness of the proceedings. Inherent in this problem is the difficulty of ascer-
taining the nature of the determination to be reviewed. 26 Section 1286 provides
that a proceeding under Article 78 to.review a discretionary determination,2 7 or to
compel performance of a duty mandated by law, 28 must be brought within four
months after the determination becomes final and binding, or, in the case of a
demand for action in accordance with law, the time begins to run as of the date
of the refusal of such demand.
In Colodney v. New York Coffee & Sugar Exchange,29 petitioners applied for
a review of action by the respondent's board of managers censuring and fining
petitioners for conduct unbecoming members of the exchange. The proceeding was
instituted within four months following the board's refusal of petitioners' demand
for performance of its alleged duty, but after four months had expired from the
date of the determination by the board. The Court of Appeals, Per Curiam, with
one judge dissenting, affirmed the Appellate Division's reversal of the trial court,30
24. Levine v. Abrams, I A.D.2d 213, 149 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1st Dep't 1956).
25. Bromberg v. McGoldrick, 281 App. Div. 1038, 121 N.Y.S.2d 367 (2d Dep't
1953), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 690, 117 N.E.2d 638 (1954).
26. Foy v. Brennan, 285 App. Div. 669, 140 N.Y.S.2d 132 (ist Dep't 1955).
27. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §1284(2). The expression "to review a determination"
refers to relief heretofore available in a certiorari or a mandamus proceeding
for the review of any act or refusal to act of any body exercising administrative
or corporate functions, which involves an exercise of judgment or discretion.
28. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §1284(3). The expression "to compel performance of
a duty specifically enjoined by law" refers to all other relief heretofore available
in a mandamus proceeding.
29. 2 N.Y.2d 149, 157 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1956).
30. 1 A,D.2d 998, 151 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Ist Dep't 1956),
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and held that the action was barred by section 1286 as untimely and therefore
respondent's motion to dismiss should have been granted.
The trial court took the position that the remedy sought was historically that
of mandamus and since the Legislature, in enacting Article 78, had not intended
to change the substantive law with respect to this remedy, the time limitation did
not begin to run until the respondent's refusal to comply with petitioners'
demand.31 If such a view were upheld, it would seem to render ineffective the
desire of the Legislature to remove the technical distinctions then existent in the
writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.32
The Court of Appeals held that the determination involved solely a juxtaposi-
tion of the exchange's standards with the conduct of the petitioners, and as such,
was clearly a matter of discretion and judgment within section 1284(2).
The dissent took the position that the petitioners had been denied due process
in their hearing before the exchange's business conduct committee and thus any
action taken by the respondent's board of managers was without jurisdiction and
void. Under this view the remedy sought was to compel performance of a legal
duty within section 1284(3) and therefore timely.33
The case represents an admonition to lawyers not to rely on their own views
of the interpretation to be given to a potential review. By filing a petition which
would be within either provision of section 1286, the attorney is assured his client
will not fall victim to the infirmity exemplified by the instant case.
31. 1 Misc.2d 643, 148 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
32. Newbrand v. City of Yonkers, 285 N.Y. 164, 174, 33 N.E.2d 75, 80 (1941);
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL (1937) pp. 180, 181.
33. Foy v. Schecter, 1 N.Y.2d 604, 154 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1956); Williams v.
Morton, 297 N.Y. 328, 79 N.E.2d 428 (1948).
